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This Symposium marks the fortieth anniversary of the enactment of the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code (the “1978 Code” or the “Code”) with an extended 
look at seismic changes that currently are reshaping Chapter 11 
reorganization. Today’s typical Chapter 11 case looks radically different than 
did the typical case in the Code’s early years. In those days, Chapter 11 
afforded debtors a cozy haven. Most everything that mattered occurred 
within the context of the formal proceeding, where the debtor enjoyed agenda 
control, a leisurely timetable, and judicial solicitude. The safe haven steadily 
disappeared over time, displaced by a range of countervailing forces and a 
cooperative bankruptcy bench. Lenders, especially debtor-in-possession 
(DIP) financers,1 gradually began to shape the trajectory of many 
proceedings. They today determine the course of most of the cases. More 
recently, additional players such as hedge funds and equity funds have also 
entered the scene, altering the bargaining dynamic. New financial instruments 
complicate debtors’ capital structures and creditor incentives. Even the sites and 
modes of decisionmaking have shifted, as today’s key decisions are negotiated 
and embedded in contracts concluded even before the debtor files for 
bankruptcy. The changes, which continue to accumulate, are fundamental. 
Congress has given a gentle assist to a few of these changes.2 Sometimes 
this has followed from direct intervention, as when Congress amended the 
Code to diminish the debtor’s agenda control of judicial reorganization 
proceedings.3 At other times the effect is indirect, as when Congress 
encouraged the use of derivatives and other new financial instruments by 
largely exempting them from key bankruptcy provisions such as the 
automatic stay that requires other creditors to halt any collection efforts.4 
Whether direct or indirect, most of the legislative interventions have been of 
minor importance and the statutory framework is largely identical to that 
enacted in 1978. The changes have been driven by innovations in 
reorganization practice and judicial interpretation. It is a dynamic situation. 
 
1 The Bankruptcy Code provides for new funding for a debtor that has filed for bankruptcy in section 
364. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it becomes the “debtor-in-possession.” See 
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107 (2012). The new financing is known as debtor-in-possession or “DIP” financing. 
2 Congress has made numerous amendments to the 1978 Code, including substantial reforms 
in 1994 and 2005. But it has not passed a complete overhaul. 
3 The Code gives the debtor the exclusive right to present a plan for the first 120 days of the 
proceeding. Formerly, some courts would indefinitely extend the exclusivity right. Since 2005, the 
Code cuts off the extensions after 18 months. See 11 U.S.C. §1121(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
4 11 U.S.C. § 561 (2012). 
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Some of the most important and controversial of these new developments, 
such as the use of restructuring support agreements to lock up votes for a 
potential reorganization, will likely have seen further evolution by the time 
this Foreword appears in print. 
This Foreword provides context for the Symposium’s academic 
contributions by recounting the historical developments that have brought us 
where we are. After chronicling the origins, New Deal redirection, and recent 
evolution of corporate reorganization, we describe some of the remarkable 
and often counterintuitive insights the articles in this Symposium offer for 
the current moment. We conclude by venturing a few thoughts about the 
future. As we shall see, the Nietzschean vision of history as eternal recurrence 
has surprising explanatory power in the bankruptcy context.5 
I. THE BIRTH OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 
American corporate reorganization first emerged in the late nineteenth 
century, facilitated by a dramatic common law innovation, the federal equity 
receivership. The new procedure was first applied to what were then the 
country’s only publicly held corporations, the railroads, and was later 
extended to other corporations.6 
The railroads filled a vital need, providing timely and affordable 
transportation for food, manufactured goods, and people. But the growth and 
expansion of the private railway companies was haphazard. Entrepreneurs 
competing to control essential routes, such as New York to Chicago, raced to 
build track and acquire smaller railroads, waging epic battles over key links 
such as the Erie Railway.7 During flush periods, the railroads attracted huge 
amounts of capital and investment, most of it debt capital. When the 
economy crashed, as it did with some regularity during the nineteenth 
century, numerous railroads defaulted. 
The default of a substantial railroad posed a serious dilemma. Since the 
railroads were crucial to America’s future, there was an enormous public 
 
5 As Friedrich Nietzche proclaimed, “[w]hat if a demon crept after you into your loneliest 
loneliness some day or night, and said to you: ‘This life, as you live it at present, and have lived it, 
you must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but 
every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great 
in your life must come to you again, and all in the same series and sequence and similarly this spider 
and this moonlight among the trees, and similarly this moment, and I myself. The eternal sand glass 
of existence will ever be turned once more, and you with it, you speck of dust!’” FRIEDRICH 
NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE § 341 (Walter Kaufman trans., Random House 1974) (1887). 
6 Many of the developments in this part are described in greater detail in DAVID A. SKEEL, 
JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 48-70 (2001). 
7 See generally JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE SCARLET WOMAN OF WALL STREET: JAY GOULD, JIM 
FISK, CORNELIUS VANDERBILT, THE ERIE RAILWAY WARS, & THE BIRTH OF WALL STREET (1988). 
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interest in rescuing and sustaining them. A defaulting line’s creditors were 
likely to see things the same way, favoring reorganization over liquidation. 
Despite this pervasive support, the most obvious strategies for facilitating a 
reorganization faced serious constitutional obstacles.8 Today, there are no 
doubts about Congress’s ability to pass a reorganization law. In the nineteenth 
century, by contrast, the Commerce Clause was much more narrowly 
construed, and might not have provided constitutional authority for a 
reorganization law. Congress’s other source of authority, the Bankruptcy 
Clause, was similarly shaky, because there were serious questions regarding 
whether a reorganization law would impermissibly encroach on the chartering 
state’s role as the principal regulator of corporations. In theory, a railroad’s 
state of incorporation could pass a railroad reorganization law. Unfortunately, 
such a state-level enactment would have amounted to an idle gesture, for 
states could not alter existing contracts and had no power to regulate beyond 
their borders—a potentially crippling limitation given a multi-state railroad. 
It was against this backdrop that the equity receivership emerged. When 
a railroad defaulted, its creditors would commence two related actions, often 
in coordination with the line’s managers: first, bondholders who held 
mortgages on some of the assets would ask the court to commence a 
foreclosure proceeding; second, other creditors would ask the court to turn 
control over all of the company’s assets to a receiver. The bondholder 
plaintiffs in the first action, rather than asking for a prompt foreclosure sale, 
would ask the court to put the sale on hold. During the intervening weeks, 
the investment banks that had sold the railroad’s stock and bonds would form 
committees to represent each different type of security. The debtor and the 
committees would negotiate the terms of a restructuring. Once terms had 
been agreed upon, the parties would combine the committees into one large 
reorganization committee. The bondholder plaintiffs would then ask the court 
to schedule the foreclosure sale. The only bidder at the sale would be the 
reorganization committee, which would submit a bid consisting of the bonds 
and stock held by the investors who had agreed to be represented by a 
committee, together with enough cash to pay dissenting investors.9 
The process the parties concocted was the world’s first large scale 
corporate reorganization framework, an invention borne of necessity. But the 
equity receivership did not emerge fully formed like Athena from Zeus’s 
 
8 SKEEL, supra note 6, at 52–56 (describing various constitutional considerations). 
9 In the words of Paul Cravath, namesake of the Cravath firm and the leading reorganization 
lawyer of his time, “Counsel who have acted frequently for reorganization committees have spent a 
great many anxious hours preparing for the unexpected bidder, but in my own experience he has 
never appeared.” Paul D. Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last 
Decade, in 1 SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION, AND 
REGULATION 204 (Francis Lynde Stetson et al. eds., 1917). 
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head. The parties confronted a variety of obstacles, which they solved through 
contract, court approval, or both. Because most railroads were fully 
encumbered with mortgages when the receivership commenced, it might be 
impossible for them to borrow the funds they needed to continue operating 
during the receivership, since the new money would be subordinate to the 
existing mortgage liens. The reorganizers solved this problem by creating 
“receiver’s certificates.” If the court approved a receiver’s certificate, it was 
given the first share of the debtor’s revenues, before they ever got to the 
mortgage bondholders. Receiver’s certificates were the forerunner to what we 
now call DIP financing.10 
Another problem was the cost of paying dissenting bondholders and 
stockholders—the investors who refused to “deposit” their securities with the 
committees. Paying these investors in full would have invited holdouts and 
undermined the composition process, since investors who declined to deposit 
their securities would get paid much more than those who participated in the 
restructuring. To solve this problem, the reorganizers persuaded courts to set 
an “upset price.” This price was ostensibly the fair value of the defaulted 
security. Rather than paying dissenters in full, the reorganization committee, 
as winning bidder, was only required to pay them the upset price. This 
significantly diminished the incentive to hold out, especially when the 
reorganizers persuaded the court to set a low upset price.11 
There was also a question regarding the priority status of unsecured 
creditors vis-à-vis shareholders, a question that famously came to the fore in 
an early twentieth century case, Northern Pacific Railroad v. Boyd.12 There, a 
creditor who had been wiped out in a reorganization that gave a continued 
stake to the railroad’s old shareholders, despite the shareholders’ lower 
priority, challenged the receivership as fraudulent.13 The Supreme Court 
vindicated the creditor, holding that the exclusion from participation was 
impermissible.14 This was a serious complication, because shareholder 
support was thought to be essential to the receivership process, in part 
because shareholders often contributed new funds to the reorganization. 
Reorganizers once again created a clever workaround: they started inviting 
 
10 Relatedly, courts developed the doctrine of necessity to address the need to pay suppliers. 
This is the forerunner to what we now call critical vendor doctrine. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 
F.3d 866, 871 (2004) (discussing the origins of the doctrine of necessity). 
11 See Joseph L. Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization, 27 
COLUM. L. REV. 132, 142 (1927) (considering upset price from the point of view of the reorganization 
committee). The upset price also was used to compensate third parties whose claims were released. 
12 228 U.S. 482 (1913). 
13 Id. at 488.  
14 Id. at 510. 
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general creditors to participate in the receivership, but only if they too agreed 
to pay a cash subscription toward the effort.15 
The question of the parties’ respective priority rights also prompted the 
most important scholarly exchange of the equity receivership era. In a 1927 
article, the leading corporate reorganization lawyer of the time argued that 
mortgage holders’ priorities should not be strictly enforced, because 
reorganizers needed flexibility to craft a reorganization plan.16 The following 
year, two other legal scholars identified this as the “relative priority” approach 
and contrasted it with “absolute” priority, posing two “rival” priority 
schemes.17 They criticized the malleability of the relative priority approach, 
but concluded that some version of it was probably inevitable.18 It turned out 
that relative priority was not quite as inevitable as they thought, at least in 
the short run. A decade later it would be gone. 
II. REIMAGINING BANKRUPTCY IN THE NEW DEAL 
The Depression brought stresses and strains to the corporate 
reorganization system, leading to two congressional interventions. The first, 
in 1933 and 1934, straightened out some dysfunctional elements in equity 
receivership practice but otherwise did little to disrupt the process. 
Dissatisfaction with the inherited system grew as the decade wore on, 
resulting in a second, completely transformative intervention in 1938. 
The equity receivership mechanism ceased to function reliably in the 
wake of the economy’s collapse. The upset price emerged as a barrier because 
reorganizing companies lacked the cash to pay even a low-ball sum. The New 
Dealers came to the rescue with the Bankruptcy Acts of 1933 and 1934, which 
codified large-scale corporate reorganization for the first time.19 The initial 
legislation removed barriers from the existing playing field but otherwise did 
little to disrupt the process context. 
The leading reorganizers warmly embraced the 1934 legislation, lobbying 
actively in support. An essential contribution of the new provisions, as they 
saw it, was a new voting rule, which facilitated the approval of a plan of 
reorganization by a majority of the creditors and overrode bond contract 
 
15 See, e.g., ROBERT T. SWAINE, 1 THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS: 1819–1906 
497 (1946) (highlighting the use of the Boyd decree strategy). 
16 Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27 
COLUM. L. REV. 901, 907 (1927). 
17 See James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of 
Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 130 (1928) (differentiating 
between the theory of relative priority and the theory of absolute priority). 
18 Id. at 165. 
19 See Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911 (repealed 1938) (summarizing 
reorganization protocol for non-railroads). 
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provisions requiring unanimous consent to amendments of terms.20  This gave 
the committees the power to bind dissenters to the plan and removed the need 
to pay them a cash upset price. Codification also removed concerns that courts 
might restrict the use of the receivership process outside of the railroad context. 
The next phase of reform was less congenial to the reorganization 
establishment. In the mid-1930s, the newly formed Securities and Exchange 
Commission conducted a massive study of large-scale reorganization cases. 
Led by William O. Douglas, then a law professor at Yale, the SEC 
investigators interviewed well over one hundred participants in the major 
recent receivership cases, which they chronicled in a multivolume report.21 
Douglas and his colleagues—including Abe Fortas, who, like Douglas himself, 
later became a Supreme Court Justice—found evidence of fraud and other 
misbehavior, and concluded that ordinary investors were poorly served by the 
Wall Street banks and lawyers who dominated the committee-driven 
receivership process. In a speech before the Eastern Law Students 
Conference in Washington D.C., Douglas accused his fellow lawyers of 
having forgotten their vow as lawyers to put their clients’ interests before 
their own. “[T]here has been a degeneration of the bar in these situations,” 
he complained.22 “Conflicts of interest have had their corroding influence.”23 
The concerns of those behind the SEC study and of scholars sympathetic 
to their mission can be distilled to three major objectives. First, they believed 
that reorganization should be much more closely monitored by the courts. 
Under existing practice, courts did not come into the picture until the end of 
the process, after the parties had worked out the details and were ready for 
the “sale” to take place under the equity receivership or the plan to be 
confirmed under the 1934 legislation. The reformers called for judicial 
oversight from the proceeding’s beginning. The second objective concerned 
technical wherewithal. Judicial oversight, by itself, would not suffice. 
Administrative expertise also was needed in the service of investor protection 
because appropriate outcomes in a complex reorganization required a wider 
range of neutral, expert input than followed from neutral adjudication of a 
litigated issue.24 The third objective was “democracy.” Under current practice, 
 
20 See Robert T. Swaine, An Open Letter Containing Proposals for Amendment of the Bankruptcy 
Act So As to Aid in Combating the Depression, in Symposium, Corporate Reorganization Under the Federal 
Bankruptcy Power, 19 VA. L. REV. 317, 333-34 (1933) (setting forth the “essentials” of a measure to 
address “the appalling extent of financial and industrial distress”).  
21 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND 
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE 
AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937). 
22 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC 
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 233 (James Allen ed., 1940). 
23  Id.  
24 Id. at 194-95. 
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investors had no real say in the process once they had deposited their bonds 
with a committee. The reformers believed that the process needed to be 
democratized, and that investors should be the ones to determine the 
outcome, either directly or through representatives they freely elect.25 
During this same period, Congressman Chandler of Tennessee had 
introduced an extensive set of bankruptcy reforms, many of which were 
technical adjustments to the provisions that applied in consumer and small 
business cases. In 1937, Douglas, who had become the SEC’s chairman, 
persuaded advocates of the Chandler bill to include in the legislation a new, 
SEC-drafted chapter applicable to large corporations. The new chapter, 
Chapter X, was enacted in 1938. It sharply increased the judicial and 
administrative role by requiring that the debtor’s managers be replaced by a 
court-appointed trustee, by providing for judicial oversight throughout the 
case, and by requiring that the SEC be given an opportunity to scrutinize 
most proposed reorganization plans and deliver an evaluation directly to the 
confirming court. Although Chapter X did not eliminate committee 
representation altogether, it did provide for a direct vote on the plan by 
investors—not the committee—thus enhancing the democracy of the process.26 
One risk was that the reorganizers would attempt to evade the new 
framework by restructuring large corporations outside of bankruptcy. The 
reformers anticipated this possibility, and sought to preempt it the following 
year. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) included a provision—the 
creditor consent requirement of section 316(b)—that prohibits a corporation 
from imposing a modification of a bond’s payment terms on a particular 
bondholder absent the bondholder’s consent. This provision made it illegal to 
apply majoritarian voting provisions (known today as “collective action 
clauses” or “CACs”) to the payment terms in corporate bonds. It followed 
that judicially supervised bankruptcy reorganization, now built around 
majority-approved plans to which dissenters were bound, provided the only 
viable venue in which to effect a bond workout. 
The same year, Douglas, whose meteoric rise had by then landed him on 
the Supreme Court, held that the ambiguous term “fair and equitable” in the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1934 required strict adherence to the absolute priority 
 
25 The reformers generally emphasized the first option—a meaningful vote by investors on the 
plan—but at least one reformer advocated representative democracy. See Roger S. Foster, Book 
Review, 43 YALE L.J. 352, 357 (1933) (reviewing MAX LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933)). 
For a scathing critique of the democratization effort by the leading reorganization lawyer, see Robert 
T. Swaine, “Democratization” of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 256 (1938). 
26 See Mark Roe characterizes the advent of New Deal oversight as the first of three “ages” of 
American bankruptcy law in a recent article. Mark J. Roe, Three Ages of Bankruptcy, 7 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 187, 188 (2017) (describing the “rise and dominance of administration, deal, and sale [which] make 
for three ages of bankruptcy.”). As the text reflects, we parse the history slightly differently, identifying 
equity receivership as the opening gambit and finding recurring themes in the periods that follow.  
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rule,27 even though none of the Supreme Court’s absolute priority cases had 
ever actually adopted the usage relied upon.28 The adoption, which carried 
over to Chapter X under the Chandler Act of 1938, amounted to a give back 
to dissenters. If, under majoritarian voting, a creditor could be forced to 
accept reduced principal or interest payments or other impairment of its 
claim, it was thought to be unfair simultaneously to permit any junior 
claimant to participate in the reorganization. It followed that old shareholders 
would not be permitted to retain a stake in the reorganized company even if 
higher priority creditors voted to approve it. This increased the safeguards 
for ordinary investors, most of whom held bonds in this era, even as it 
narrowed the range of their “democratic” options. 
The interpolation of absolute priority also built in additional dependence 
on outside technical expertise. Under the absolute priority rule, a senior class 
of creditors must be paid “in full” in some form before any junior claimant 
could receive a participation under the reorganization plan. Given payment in 
the form of a new security issued by the reorganized company (and in the 
absence of a trading market in the reorganized firm’s securities), it takes a full-
dress valuation of the reorganized company to support a judicial ruling that the 
new security being issued to the creditor class in fact amounts to payment “in 
full.” Thus would the SEC scrutineers in Chapter X focus closely not just on 
the plan’s terms, but also on the supporting valuation of the corporate debtor.29 
The old receivership practice withered away after the Chandler Act of 
1938 was enacted, very much as the reformers intended. Their court-centered 
framework held sway for the next forty years.30 
III. CORPORATE REORGANIZATION UNDER THE 1978 CODE 
The new Code enacted in 1978 greatly relaxed the restrictions that the 
New Deal reformers had put in place for large corporate reorganizations. 
Chapter 11, the new reorganization chapter, not only permitted managers to 
continue running the business, rather than replacing them with a court-
appointed trustee; it also gave managers the exclusive right to propose a 
reorganization plan for at least the first four months of the case.31 The Code 
also gave the parties more flexibility with respect to the terms of a possible 
 
27 See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1939). 
28 John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority after Ahlers, 87 MICH L. REV. 963, 975 (1989) 
(“Strictly speaking, this is poppycock, and Justice Douglas knew it.”). 
29 For the classic, critical account of valuation in this era, see Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. 
Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651 (1974). See 
also Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565 (1950). 
30 For discussion of the erosion of the New Deal framework that took place after the first 
decade of the Chandler Act, see SKEEL, supra note 6, at 161-68.  
31 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1121(b) (2012). 
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reorganization plan. Rather than applying the absolute priority rule to every 
class of claimant and every reorganization plan, the rule could be invoked only 
on the contingency that a given class of claimants rejected the proposed plan 
and then only would be applied as to the complaining class.32 If a sufficient 
majority of a class voted to approve the plan,33 the absolute priority rule could 
be waived. Overall, these changes reduced the need for judicial oversight and 
shifted authority back to the negotiating parties themselves—a shift 
augmented by the elimination of the SEC’s role as advisor and watchdog. At 
the same time, the decision to allow creditors to waive the absolute priority 
rule expanded the range of creditor democracy in bankruptcy.34 
Wall Street reorganization practice reemerged after forty years in the 
wilderness under the 1978 Code, rejuvenated by Chapter 11’s new framework. 
Since corporate managers no longer faced immediate displacement by a 
trustee, they were more willing to file for bankruptcy. For some firms, 
bankruptcy even became a plausible strategic option, rather than an absolute 
last resort.35 Within a few years, nearly every major law firm had started (and 
begun touting) a bankruptcy practice.36 
The Code era of the past four decades has not followed a single 
trajectory—it has included at least two, and possibly three, phases. In the first 
phase, which lasted a little over a decade, the managers of a debtor enjoyed 
significant agenda control after filing for bankruptcy. Because courts routinely 
extended their four-month “exclusivity period,” sometimes for years, managers 
could weaken creditors’ resistance by implicitly threatening to drag the case out 
indefinitely. There were complaints that managers used their leverage to extract 
deviations from absolute priority from the creditors, although the deviations 
were never as pronounced as the complaints sometimes implied.37 
The second phase began in the mid-1990s and reached maturity after 
2000. In this phase creditors effectively used contractual provisions to 
 
32 Under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), the absolute priority rule only applies “with respect to each class 
of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.” 
33 For a class of creditors, two-thirds by amount and more than one-half of the number of 
claimants; for an equity class, two-thirds in amount. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c), (d) (2012). 
34 The drafters did not show the same confidence in the voting process in consumer bankruptcy 
cases. Under the old law, creditors voted whether to approve a payment plan approved by a consumer 
debtor. Chapter 13, which now governs proposed payment plans, does not provide for a creditor vote. 
35 See generally KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: HOW CORPORATIONS AND 
CREDITORS USE CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY TO THEIR ADVANTAGE (1998). 
36 See, e.g., Leonard M. Rosen & Jane Lee Vris, A History of the Bankruptcy Bar in the Second 
Circuit, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION LAW IN THE COURTS OF 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES 155, 156 (1995) (noting that forty-nine of the top 
fifty New York law firms claimed to have a bankruptcy practice). 
37 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s Share in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 126 (1990) 
(describing the deviations as a “tempest in a teapot”). 
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counteract the debtor-friendly features of the 1978 Code. Debtor-in-
possession financers sometimes insisted on the appointment of a chief 
restructuring officer before or shortly after a debtor’s bankruptcy filing.38 
They also included covenants in their loan agreements that restricted the 
debtor’s discretion to manage the proceeding. For example, in the FAO 
Schwartz case (2003), the DIP loan included a covenant that required the 
debtor to liquidate if it failed to propose a confirmable reorganization plan by 
a specified date.39 The provision had the effect of eliminating management’s 
ability to use the threat of delay to extract concessions from creditors. The 
lenders in the United Airlines bankruptcy (2002) used tight cash flow 
constraints—a requirement that the debtor generate a specified amount of 
cash in excess of expenses—to force the company to renegotiate its collective 
bargaining agreements with employees.40 
Proceedings also became quicker during the second phase. Under the new 
practice, increasing numbers of debtors could largely avoid the cumbersome 
process of a traditional reorganization either by selling all of their assets or 
by seeking judicial approval of a fast-track, prepackaged bankruptcy. The sale 
route often is taken at the insistence of a DIP lender which agrees to finance 
the debtor’s Chapter 11 case only if the debtor commits to conduct a sale 
within thirty or sixty days of filing. In a prepackaged bankruptcy (a strategy 
used several times by President Trump in the 1990s), the debtor negotiates 
an out-of-court workout of its principal debt—usually bonded debt—and 
then encases the negotiated workout in a reorganization plan filed 
simultaneously with its bankruptcy petition. The objective is to enter and exit 
bankruptcy within two or three months. 
These developments altered bankruptcy practice so significantly that a 
leading bankruptcy lawyer wrote an article lamenting the beleaguered 
Chapter 11 debtor.41 The trends have continued. They have not as yet fully 
displaced more traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations. But displacement at 
times has seemed likely. 
We appear to have entered a third, current phase. The features of creditor 
control vis-à-vis the debtor continue to dominate the landscape. But the cast 
 
38 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 
784-785 (2002) (describing the implicit power of the lender in a DIP financing arrangement). 
39 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The New “New” Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 917, 926 n.34 (2003) (describing DIP financing agreement in FAO Schwartz bankruptcy). 
40 See id. (detailing United Airlines’ attempt to “extract deep concessions from its unions” as a 
result of cash flow targets set by the lender). 
41 Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, The Creditor in Possession: Creditor Control of Chapter 
11 Reorganization Cases, 21 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (2003). Tellingly, Harvey Miller temporarily left 
his law firm and joined an investment bank (Greenhill) before returning to his law firm partnership. 
Another leading bankruptcy lawyer, Jamie Sprayregen, followed the same track, going to Goldman Sachs 
and then returning. 
1582 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1571 
of characters has lengthened, with hedge funds and other distressed debt 
professionals joining DIP lenders as major players. New financial contracts 
also are having an impact. Credit derivatives are redirecting lender incentives 
in uncooperative directions.42 But other modes of contracting promote 
cooperation. In a first and second lien lending arrangement, the second 
lienholders usually agree to defer to the first lienholders on key issues, and 
sometimes even to vote as instructed by the first lienholders in a later 
bankruptcy.43 Restructuring support agreements are used by distressed 
debtors and their lenders to secure advance support for a Chapter 11 
reorganization plan. In some cases, the later, formal vote on the proposed plan 
is largely a formality, because large majorities of most classes of creditors have 
already committed to vote in favor by contract.44 
Troubled corporations also have devised clever strategies for reorganizing 
outside of bankruptcy. Although the TIA forbids direct amendment of bond 
payment terms without an individual bondholder’s consent, distressed firms 
have long used exchange offers paired with coercive “exit consents” to 
encourage large bondholder majorities to agree to a restructuring effected by 
exchange rather than direct amendment. This strategy has seen a dramatic 
increase in use and effectiveness in the past several years.45 
As we look at the current moment through the lens of bankruptcy history, 
it is not hard to see patterns of recurrence and chiasm.46 Recent bankruptcy 
practice has remarkable similarities to the old equity receivership era of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Now, as then, the parties 
manage the process through contractual agreements they negotiate among 
themselves. Although the agreements theoretically are subject to judicial 
oversight once the debtor files in Chapter 11, there often is little the court 
realistically can do to upset them. This is most evident when the DIP financer 
insists on a prompt sale of the debtor’s assets. Although a bankruptcy judge 
theoretically could reject the timeline proposed in the DIP loan, the lender 
often can credibly threaten to withhold funding and let the debtor collapse 
unless the court approves the terms. Bankruptcy judges have a more 
meaningful opportunity to scrutinize restructuring support agreements. But 
 
42 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 680-
86 (2010) (describing how credit default swaps influence bankruptcy negotiations). 
43 See Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy on the Side, NW. U.L. 
REV. 255, 260 (2017) (discussing potential benefits stemming from side agreements, as well as the dangers). 
44 Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593, 605 (2017) 
(discussing the legality of such non-binding informal agreements). 
45 This development is explored in detail in William W. Bratton, Jr. & Adam J. Levitin, The 
New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (2018). 
46 A chiasma takes the form A-B-B’-A’, where the initial theme (A), gives way to a second 
theme (B), the second theme is developed (B’), then the initial theme returns, in a way that harkens 
back to the beginning but also somehow alters or transforms it. 
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here too the path of least resistance is to approve the agreement, much as 
most courts did in the equity receivership era. 
In the current phase, the question whether absolute or relative priority is 
preferable has once again assumed critical importance. In its most important 
recent bankruptcy case, the Supreme Court invalidated an increasingly 
common circumvention of absolute priority—a practice called structured 
dismissal—much as it did a century ago in the Boyd case.47 This decision came 
in the wake of controversies over several other recent practices that stand in 
tension with the absolute priority rule, and of a passionate debate in the legal 
literature featuring many of the participants of this Symposium.48 
A few unusual bankruptcy cases have drawn even more directly from the 
receivership era, resurrecting the receivership process itself. In the 
bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors, the parties conducted a “sale” 
that transferred the debtors’ assets to a newly formed entity consisting largely 
of the debtor’s old creditors, just as used to happen in railroad receiverships.49 
The managers of the largest financial institutions, now required to prepare 
annual “living wills,” signal that they plan to use essentially the same process 
in the event of financial distress.50 
As in the receivership era, nearly all of these developments have been 
driven by innovations in practice and judicial decisions, rather than legislative 
change. There are, of course, massive differences between the current era and 
the old equity receiverships. Unlike the early twentieth century, when 
markets were poorly developed, there is much more liquidity now. This makes 
it possible to find actual, third party buyers for the assets even of large firms. 
But many of the issues are remarkably similar. 
 
47 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (holding that a bankruptcy court 
cannot “approve a structured dismissal that provides for distributions that do not follow ordinary 
priority rules without the affected creditors’ consent”). For a thoughtful analysis of Jevic, see Bruce 
Grohsgal, Absolute Priority Redux: First-Day Orders and Pre-Plan Settlements in Chapter 11 Post-Jevic, 
10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).  
48 For recent critiques of absolute priority, see Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute 
Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 821 (2017); Anthony J. 
Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 711 (2011). 
For a defense, see Barry E. Adler & George G. Triantis, Debt Priority and Options in Bankruptcy: A 
Policy Intervention, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 579-81 (2017). 
49 See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 531, 544 (2009) (summarizing the similarity between Chrysler and railroad 
receiverships); Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 727, 732 (2010) (noting that “the Chrysler reorganization handled a practical business problem 
via a sale format as did the equity receivership’s reconstruction of the American railroad system”). 
50 Under this strategy—known as the “single point of entry” approach—the holding company of 
the troubled financial institution will transfer its assets and some of its debt to a newly created entity. 
See Randall D. Guynn, Framing the TBTF Problem: The Path to a Solution (describing implementation of 
the single point of entry strategy), in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 281, 295 (Martin Neal Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014). 
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IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE NEW FRONTIERS 
The current era has seen both radical innovation in the financial markets 
and a return of some of the issues and strategies that characterized 
restructuring practice a century ago. The participants in this Symposium thus 
are seeking to make sense of an unusual and at times disorienting moment.51 
A. The New Bond Workouts 
The long hand of history can influence contemporary debt restructuring 
in unexpected ways. One such moment of influence was an unexpected turn 
in the case law treated in William Bratton and Adam Levitin’s The New Bond 
Workouts. In a cluster of cases decided in 2014 and 2015, courts in the Southern 
District of New York, the nation’s leading forum for bond litigation, adopted 
a novel and broad reading of the creditor consent provision in TIA section 
316(b).52 The new reading made bond workouts harder to close and was greeted 
with much consternation in the practice world. The status quo was, however, 
later restored when the Second Circuit reversed the leading Southern District 
case in an opinion steeped in Depression-era legislative history.53 
Bratton and Levitin use the occasion of this case law flare up to take a new 
look at workout practice and reconsider a longstanding policy question 
concerning the repeal of section 316(b). Their projection of a world without 
section 316(b) follows the pattern of historical recurrence, making reference 
to a forgotten body of cases dating from the equity receivership era. 
Bratton and Levitin draw on an original dataset to report on a remarkable 
transformation in workout practice. In the received picture, bond workouts 
are dysfunctional and tend to fail to close. Bondholders hold out and free ride 
in response to restructuring offers from distressed debtors. Debtors respond 
in kind, utilizing a variety of coercive inducements and procedural 
maneuvers. The result is a destabilizing and potentially toxic mix of creditor 
opportunism and debtor coercion that tends to derail the collective 
decisionmaking process. The Depression-era legislative inheritance doubles 
down on the dysfunction by taking the possibility of direct amendment of 
bond contract payment terms off the table in TIA section 316(b), a provision 
 
51 As were Judge Marjorie Rendell in her opening keynote on the first day critiquing the 
expansion of equitable mootness doctrine, and, on day two, Professor Troy McKenzie in his analysis of 
the starkly different implications of legislative silence in bankruptcy as compared to administrative law. 
52 See BOKF, N.A. v. Caesars Entm’t Corp., 144 F. Supp. 3d 459, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“[S]ection 316(b) protects a noteholder’s practical ability, as well as the legal right, to receive 
payment when due”); Meehancombs Glob. Credit Opportunities Funds, LP v. Caesars Entm’t 
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 507, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (same); Marblegate Asset Mgmt. v. Educ. Mgmt. 
Corp., 75 F. Supp. 3d 592, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same), rev’d, 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017). 
53 Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Fin. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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that largely accomplished its purpose of making federal bankruptcy the 
exclusive (and more costly) venue for corporate debt restructuring. Bratton 
and Levitin show that the situation has changed. Workouts are now working, 
albeit with coercive tactics figuring more prominently than ever in the recent 
fact patterns. The markets have learned how to live with section 316(b), 
denuding the longstanding policy case for its removal of much of its urgency. 
At the same time, Bratton and Levitin show that section 316(b) no longer 
accomplishes much in the way of bondholder protection and that there no 
longer is any reason to fear that out-of-court restructuring by majority 
amendment will systematically disadvantage bondholders. They recommend 
repeal accordingly, with the post-repeal process and voting rules left over to 
the determination of the drafters of bond contracts. But the authors also enter 
a caveat, based on their analysis of a second original dataset that tracks 
changes in the drafting pattern of Rule 144A bonds in the wake of the 
Southern District’s adoption of the broad reading of section 316(b). They 
predict that drafting in the wake of repeal will be responsive to bondholder 
concerns without also producing a complete set of protective process 
instructions. Abuses that beg for judicial policing could follow. Unfortunately, 
today’s judges lack the tools to do the job. Precisely because section 316(b) 
succeeded in channeling restructuring into the well-policed precincts of 
bankruptcy, the federal equity doctrine that policed out-of-court 
restructuring during the equity receivership era—the doctrine of 
intercreditor good faith duties—atrophied after 1945. The authors 
recommend its resuscitation, commending it for providing a more fact-
sensitive and targeted tool for policing overreaching in bond workouts than 
the Southern District’s broad reading of section 316(b). 
B. The Bankruptcy Partition 
The old dispute between absolute and relative priority recently reared its 
head once again at the United States Supreme Court in Czyzewski v. Jevic 
Holding Corp.54 The Court, as it has consistently done for a century, adhered 
to absolute priority, with negative implications for a number of practices in 
contemporary bankruptcy proceedings. The particular question for decision 
was highly technical and concerned a bankruptcy court’s power to order a 
“structured” dismissal; that is, a dismissal of a Chapter 11 petition that 
determines the rights of a party or parties rather than just returning all parties 
to their prepetition situations.55 The structured dismissal at issue in Jevic 
distributed the proceeds of a settlement of a claim held by the bankruptcy 
 
54 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). 
55 Id. at 979-80. 
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estate to the company’s general creditors, skipping over a class of priority 
wage claimants.56 The dismissal’s proponent argued that the priority violation 
was justified on the facts of the case because it maximized overall returns to 
the creditors.57 Furthermore, it had statutory backing under a provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code which permitted the court to “order otherwise” in 
connection with a dismissal, “for cause.”58 The Supreme Court found the 
backing inadequate, refusing to carve out a “rare case” exception—rare though 
the case may have been, there was no justification for bypassing the statute’s 
bedrock substantive precept.59 
In The Bankruptcy Partition, Douglas Baird, Anthony Casey and Randall 
Picker offer a new approach for working through the issue not only in Jevic, 
but in a large collection of cases that routinely arise in today’s Chapter 11 
proceedings. The article builds on three core insights, all derived from the 
creditors’ bargain theory. First comes a maximand: claimants focus on the 
maximization of the value of the enterprise in which they invest, rather than 
on the maximization of their aggregate wealth as a group of individuals. 
Second, the terms of the creditors’ bargain follow from the maximand—the 
creditors’ bargain pertains only to the enterprise’s bankruptcy estate, which 
is in turn partitioned off from the various interests of individual creditors. 
Third, the purpose of bankruptcy law is to provide a process that maximizes 
the value of the bankruptcy estate. The article’s critical conclusion follows 
from these insights: in a case like Jevic the salient question is not whether a 
bankruptcy reorganization should follow an absolute or relative priority 
scheme, but rather whether the subject matter under dispute lies inside or 
outside the bankruptcy partition. If the subject matter lies inside, its value 
should be maximized; if the subject matter lies outside, the outcome 
(maximization or not) is of no concern to the system. 
A line drawing exercise follows. A given creditor’s claim against the 
debtor in possession is clearly inside; a dispute between two creditors as 
regards a third-party debtor clearly lies outside. The paper focuses on difficult 
cases that lie between the two extremes, drawing the line between inside and 
outside. That accomplished, the paper looks more closely at the implications 
of the goal of maximizing the value of the estate. The goal justifies aggressive 
policing of the conduct of opportunistic claimants by the bankruptcy judge. 
Estate value maximization also leads to contracting between the estate and 
 
56 Id. at 980-81. 
57 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 185 (3d Cir. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017) 
(“[the settlement], unsatisfying as it was, remained the least bad alternative since there was ‘no 
prospect’ of a plan being confirmed and conversion to Chapter 7 would have resulted in the secured 
creditors taking all that remained of the estate in ‘short order.’”). 
58 11 U.S.C. § 349(b) (2012). 
59 Jevic, 137 S. Ct. at 987. 
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outsiders—transactions that cross the partition. As to these, the fact that the 
transaction holds out benefits to a prepetition creditor should not of itself 
lead to prohibitive intervention on distributive grounds, for contracts 
normally lead to benefits for both counterparties. At the same time, occasions 
for judicial policing are likely to arise when a prepetition creditor is also a 
postpetition contract counterparty. 
Baird, Casey, and Picker work within this framework to provide a nuanced 
template for treatment of a range of recurring issues, among them, third-
party releases, senior-to-junior gifting, vote designation, contracts with 
vendors, roll ups, settlements, and other postpetition transactions between 
the debtor and prepetition creditors. 
C. Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity  
Whereas Baird, Casey and Picker seek to chart the boundaries of 
bankruptcy, distinguishing in and out, Melissa Jacoby trains her attention on 
a tension within bankruptcy itself in Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity: the 
relationship between bankruptcy’s public and private dimensions. Jacoby 
begins by repudiating the assumption that corporate bankruptcy should focus  
“solely on wealth maximization, voluntary lenders, and investors.”60 Jacoby 
argues that the preoccupation with welfare maximization deflects attention from 
the public dimension of bankruptcy, and has abetted the increasing privatization 
of the bankruptcy process. Bankruptcy should be viewed, instead, as a public-
private partnership. Jacoby is particularly concerned with bankruptcy’s 
democratic legitimacy. Drawing on a range of studies, she points out that 
procedural justice is essential to maintaining the legitimacy of legal systems. Her 
focus on democratic values echoes the concerns of the New Deal reformers, but 
takes them in a strikingly new direction to consider not just traditional creditors, 
but the victims of discrimination of a debtor like Bethlehem Steel and others 
who are affected by a corporate debtor’s bankruptcy. 
One of the culprits in Jacoby’s account is venue selection, which enables 
many large corporate debtors to file their bankruptcies in New York or 
Delaware. The cases often are far from ordinary parties’ homes, thus making 
it difficult for them to participate in the case. The equitable mootness 
doctrine undermines the public function of bankruptcy in a different but 
related way. By thwarting appeals, equitable mootness reduces the 
institutional check on deals struck by private parties. Jacoby also criticizes the 
strong resistance to appointing a trustee in Chapter 11 cases, contending that 
an independent trustee is more likely than the debtor-in-possession or the 
creditors’ committee to police misbehavior or seek to avoid prebankruptcy 
 
60 Melissa Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2018). 
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transfers. Lenders may further disarm public oversight by insisting on 
protection from avoidance actions, as in the much discussed Jevic case. Jacoby 
proposes the creation of a Sunlight Fund “designed to reduce the ability of 
private parties with leverage to deter estate-enhancing and public-value-
promoting activity.”61 Jacoby concludes by decrying the absence of diversity 
in corporate bankruptcy scholarship, attributing the dearth of attention to 
public values in part to the homogeneity of the most widely-cited scholars. 
D. Taking Control Rights Seriously 
In Taking Control Rights Seriously, Robert Rasmussen revisits an issue he 
first took up in a classic 2002 article: the control exerted by debtor-in-
possession financers.62 The earlier article was among the first to identify the 
rise of lender influence, and it treated this development as a central feature 
of a radically changing bankruptcy landscape in which traditional Chapter 11 
reorganizations were being displaced by going concern sales. The 2002 article, 
like other work that followed it, focused on the lenders’ seeming hegemony. 
In Taking Control Rights Seriously, Rasmussen takes the inquiry into creditor 
control in the opposite direction, asking why lenders do not insist on even 
greater control. Although it may seem hard to imagine that lenders could 
assert more influence than they already do, Rasmussen remarks that the 
Bankruptcy Code leaves existing control rights largely untouched, instead 
focusing far more on cash flow rights. The strategies that lenders have devised 
to shape the managers’ behavior and the bankruptcy case consist of vetoes 
and checks rather than true control rights. Tight covenants give lenders the 
power to limit capital expenditures, for instance, or dictate the timeline of 
the bankruptcy case. They do not, however, give lenders direct control. 
Why, then, do creditors not insist on true control rights, such as the power 
to remove the chief executive officer or place representatives on the board of 
directors if the debtor defaults? Says Rasmussen, it is possible that the current 
strategy is optimal: “The reason for being circumspect in control could be 
that giving formal control rights to lenders upon certain triggering events 
would raise the specter of opportunistic behavior.”63 But the absence of lender 
control rights may also reflect a less benign combination of managers’ desire 
to retain control and lenders’ fear that they could face lender liability 
litigation or equitable subordination if they took a more direct role in the 
business. The risk of legal constraints thus impedes desirable control 
arrangements. Rasmussen suggests that companies be given the right to waive 
 
61 Id. at 1743.  
62 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 38, at 784-85. 
63 Robert Rasmussen, Taking Control Rights Seriously, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 1770 (2018). 
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lender liability and equitable subordination in their corporate charters, a 
proposal that subtly links the concerns of Rasmussen’s early and more recent 
work. 
E. Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm 
Like Rasmussen, David Skeel and George Triantis are concerned with the 
parties’ intentions as reflected in actual contracts, rather than hypothetical 
ones. In the 1990s, economics-oriented scholars often criticized the 
mandatory structure of the Bankruptcy Code, and advocated greater freedom 
to contract over alternatives. Examining the Code and its historical context, 
Skeel and Triantis contend that bankruptcy law is not nearly as mandatory as 
common wisdom suggests, especially as compared to the former Bankruptcy 
Act. The Code invites the parties to contract over key features of bankruptcy, 
and the parties now seize the opportunity, as many of the authors in the 
Symposium point out here and in other work. 
But there’s a catch, Skeel and Triantis argue: the endorsement of 
contracting is unbalanced. While courts and the Code facilitate ex post 
contracting, they are much more hostile to ex ante contracts. Drawing on 
contracting theory, Skeel and Triantis consider the costs and benefits of ex 
ante and ex post contracting. Although ex post contracts do offer genuine 
benefits—they take place in an information rich environment, for instance—
ex ante contracts, where information is more limited, can promote reliance 
and allocate monitoring responses.64 Skeel and Triantis conclude that courts 
should be less hostile to ex ante contracts such as intercreditor agreements. 
More counterintuitively, they also contend that courts have been too quick to 
accommodate ex post contracts. Although courts are understandably reluctant 
to disrupt agreements that the parties reach ex post, even a unanimously 
approved agreement may inefficiently unravel the parties’ ex ante commitments. 
F. Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankruptcy  
As we have seen, judicial valuation is a central—indeed unavoidable— 
component of absolute priority review of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan. It 
is also a notoriously difficult factual inquiry, a mode of judicial proceeding 
famous for susceptibility to manipulative inputs from claimants, their 
counsel, and their hired experts. We have also seen that the drafters of the 
Chandler Act of 1938 attempted to solve the manipulation problem by 
mandating SEC input on the valuation question. 
 
64 In their comments on the article, Judge Michelle Harner and Professor Patrick Bolton each 
emphasized that an additional benefit of ex post contracting is the judicial oversight and 
transparency provided by bankruptcy. 
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Valuation lost its central place in Chapter 11 plan confirmation when the 
Code was redesigned in 1978, making absolute priority review an option 
contingent on classwide dissent rather than an absolute requirement. Under 
the conventional wisdom during the first phase of the history of post-1978 
Chapter 11 practice, judicial valuations would be the exception rather than the 
rule under the new system. The parties would resolve doubts in favor of 
supporting a plan of reorganization to avoid the uncertainty and expense of a 
valuation proceeding, at least as regarded a big, publicly traded debtor. At the 
same time, scholars during the 1978 Code’s first phase devoted a great deal of 
energy to devising new approaches to corporate reorganization that would 
altogether obviate the need to value the debtor in court. 
In Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankruptcy, Kenneth Ayotte and Edward 
Morrison return bankruptcy valuation practice to a front and center position. 
They study 143 cases entailing a valuation dispute decided since 1990, 
showing at a minimum that today’s parties do not shrink from contesting 
points of valuation. Around one-third of the cases arose in connection with 
plan confirmation disputes. The rest are split between valuation issues in 
connection with avoidance of fraudulent or preferential transfers, adequate 
protection disputes, claims allowance, dismissals, and section 363 sales. 
Professors Ayotte and Morrison catalogue the valuation techniques 
employed and patterns of disputation, highlighting soft points where lawyers 
succeed at luring judges away from adherence to financial economic 
orthodoxy. Even as the background of financial learning has become much 
more extensive and sophisticated since 1938, it seems that the hoodwinking 
of judges remains a salient problem. Opinions allowing small “premium” add-
ons to discount rates derived pursuant to the capital asset pricing model for 
use in discounted cash flow valuations come in for particularly sharp criticism. 
Judicial performance in comparable company and comparable transaction 
valuation gets higher marks—these inquiries depend more on common sense 
than on theoretical training and aptitude. Overall, the authors recommend a 
more “confined and standardized toolkit than the wide-open space that 
currently exists,” making very specific suggestions that get the bankruptcy 
courts from here to there. 
G.  The Creditors’ Bargain Revisited 
For the past generation, the creditors’ bargain model, which 
conceptualizes bankruptcy as a hypothetical bargain addressing creditors’ 
collective action problems, has exerted a gravitational pull both on those 
sympathetic to its logic and on those who reject its premise that bankruptcy 
has a single objective. In The Creditors’ Bargain Revisited, Barry Adler returns 
to one of his best known articles, which offered a novel alternative to current 
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Chapter 11 for solving creditors’ collective action problems.65 Under Adler’s 
approach, firms would issue “Chameleon Equity” that would convert from 
debt to equity if the debtor failed to cure a default. The past decade has seen 
the emergence of financial instruments such as contingent convertible bonds 
that could be a tentative first step toward the regime Adler envisioned. Here 
was the opportunity for a little victory lap. 
But The Creditors’ Bargain Revisited pivots in a very different direction. 
Prompted by suggestions from bankruptcy practitioners that “if freed from 
legal constraint, creditors would not only contract out of bankruptcy but out 
of any collective proceeding,” Adler speculates that the much vaunted 
collective action problem might not be a problem at all.66 The “race to the 
courthouse” could actually be a solution—a consummation devoutly to be wished. 
Shutting down companies that are unable to pay their debts might be more 
efficient than giving them a bankruptcy option, Adler suggests, or perhaps a 
debtor’s principal creditors could determine whether to preserve the firm even 
in the absence of bankruptcy. Adler concludes that bankruptcy may not be 
necessary at all. Its only real contribution, perhaps, is to “launder” the firm’s 
assets by assuring that any sale or discharge is free and clear of existing interests. 
 
*** 
 
A RETROSPECTIVE LOOK AT BANKRUPTCY’S NEW FRONTIERS. The 
creditors’ bargain model of bankruptcy looms so large in bankruptcy 
scholarship that it is easy to forget that the theory was devised by a real person 
at a particular point in time. The best antidote is of course to hear from the 
originator himself. And we did. At the conference giving rise to the 
Symposium, Tom Jackson recounted the origins of the theory in the years 
immediately after the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. He has turned his 
address into an essay that reveals the serendipity that often attends the 
emergence of pathbreaking ideas, and which we predict will occupy a 
significant place in the annals of American financial history.67 Jackson, who has 
returned to bankruptcy scholarship and policy after years as a law school dean and 
university president, also turns his attention to the current moment, mentioning 
 
65 Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 323-24 (1993); see also Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
439, 445 n.19 (1992) (“A neutral legal environment that permits firms meaningfully to opt out of 
bankruptcy could prompt virtually all firms to solve the collective action problem with contracts 
prior to any investor’s contribution of capital.”). 
66 Adler’s speculation is foreshadowed by another key article. See Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate 
Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 351 (1997) (arguing that the “collective action problem is largely illusory”). 
67 See generally Thomas H. Jackson, A Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1867 (2018).  
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his own important work on bankruptcy for banks and assessing recent 
developments such as the renewed debate over absolute and relative priority and 
the increased prevalence of going concern sales in recent Chapter 11 cases. 
V. THE WAY FORWARD? 
In the views of many, the dramatic market innovations of the past several 
decades have permanently transformed American corporate reorganization. 
The best known of these interventions—written by participants in this 
Symposium—proclaimed the “end of bankruptcy” as new techniques and 
expanded markets made the traditional reorganization process unnecessary.68 
One of us also has written in this vein.69 
Two implicit claims inform the case that bankruptcy has moved on from 
its point of origin to a qualitatively different place. First, contemporary 
business is so different from that of the nineteenth-century railroads that the 
traditional model of reorganization has lost its relevance. The railroads had a 
hierarchical structure and were seen to further a public interest, factors which 
made them apt candidates for the state-controlled reorganization context. 
Contemporary firms are far less hierarchical and can easily morph their 
corporate structure, making it more likely that they can succeed in 
restructuring on their own.70 Second, contemporary markets have become so 
fully developed as to render reorganization largely unnecessary. The value of a 
nineteenth century railroad could only be realized through a restructuring, 
because potential buyers did not have access to sufficient capital to purchase the 
entire firm. In the twenty-first century, by contrast, capital flows so freely that 
buyers can easily be found for any valuable line of business or valuable firm. 
There is no longer any going concern value, this line of reasoning concludes, 
that can only be preserved by a state-sponsored, collective proceeding. 
Although the changes in firms and in the markets in which the firms rise 
and fall are indeed profound, we remain persuaded that the pattern is more 
of recurrence than of fundamental transformation—or termination. Although 
market innovation clearly has altered corporate reorganization practice, many 
of today’s pressing questions are remarkably similar to the questions of the 
past. Critics worry that there is not enough judicial oversight of key 
transactions such as sales of most or all of the company’s assets. There are 
debates about the compensation of bankruptcy professionals and about 
whether ordinary creditors are sufficiently protected. William O. Douglas 
surely would nod his head in recognition if he heard these complaints. 
 
68 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 38, at 785. 
69 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 39, at 922 (noting that changes in the profiles of businesses in 
bankruptcy and contractual developments introduced new incentives to corporate managers). 
70 See Roe, supra note 26, at 214-16 (emphasizing the tendency toward decentralization). 
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The key recurring theme of American bankruptcy, in our view, is the 
tension between the terms and effects of consensual arrangements reached by 
the parties and a perceived need for government intervention to correct 
potential distortions and third-party effects. Start with the consensual 
arrangements. In the bankruptcy context, these arrangements are generally 
contractual, whether they take the form of contracts that parties entered into 
prior to financial distress, implicate later renegotiation of such contracts, or 
are new contracts entered into during the financial distress. Sometimes 
renegotiation takes place prior to bankruptcy—as with the bond exchanges 
addressed by Bratton and Levitin. Sometimes renegotiation takes place in 
bankruptcy—as with the structured dismissals discussed by Baird, Casey, and 
Picker. Sometimes the parties facilitate reorganization by entering new 
contracts such as restructuring support agreements. 
Although deference to consensual arrangements runs deep, so too does 
the perception that the parties cannot simply be left to their own devices. 
According to the classic expression of this theme, dating back to the mid-
twentieth century, markets cannot be trusted to be self-regulating.71 In 
current bankruptcy, judicial oversight of the bankruptcy process is the most 
pervasive governmental function. The bankruptcy judge oversees nearly 
every facet of the process, from resolving objections to the parties’ claims to 
confirming a proposed reorganization plan.72 In addition, the government 
supplies technical assistance in some contexts. Under the old Chandler Act, 
the SEC provided a lengthy analysis of the proposed reorganization plan in 
large cases. This function has been removed, but current bankruptcy law 
authorizes the court to appoint an examiner to provide objective, expert 
assistance.73 The courts have accepted the invitation; in recent cases, 
examiners have prepared voluminous reports whose conclusions shape the 
outcome of the case. In Caesar’s, the examiner’s report appears to have 
catalyzed the reorganization. Now, as in the 1930s, the court also has a 
democracy-furthering role. The court can disqualify the votes of creditors 
that have a conflict of interest, for instance, and, as Melissa Jacoby points out, 
they can take steps to enhance the perceived fairness of the process. 
Whether the current level of oversight is sufficient is a matter of debate. 
The gamesmanship of sophisticated distressed debt investors has brought 
warnings about ominous phenomena like “empty voting” and the “empty 
 
71 See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 73 (1957) (“To allow the market mechanism 
to be the sole director of the fate of human beings . . . would result in the demolition of society.”). 
72 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2012) (providing that the court determines claims); 11 U.S.C. § 1129 
(2012) (determining when a court may confirm a plan). 
73 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Understanding Failure: Examiners and 
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Public Companies, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 51 (2010) (examining 
“[t]he claim that professionals might impede requests for and appointments of examiners”). 
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core.”74 Other recently expressed concerns echo the complaints of the 1930s, 
when the perception that corporate reorganization did not have sufficient 
adult supervision and the surge of support for progressive reforms prompted 
a dramatic enhancement of governmental oversight. As we have already 
noted—and not dissimilarly to the pattern of the 1930s—a party today has a 
good chance of short circuiting judicial discretion by presenting its 
transaction as a fait accompli. As in the 1930s, bankruptcy professionals 
sometimes seem to be the principal beneficiaries of the bankruptcy process. 
Nor do the similarities end there. A blue-ribbon panel has recently rolled 
out a lengthy list of mostly technical proposed bankruptcy amendments.75 In 
its nearly four-hundred page report, the American Bankruptcy Institute 
commission advocates dozens of reforms, much as the forebears of the 
National Bankruptcy Conference did in the 1930s. It is not hard to imagine 
these technical reforms getting swept up in a progressive or populist wave, as 
did the reorganization reforms of the 1930s. Whereas the key advocate of the 
earlier reforms, William O. Douglas, came from the SEC, his most likely 
successor currently resides in Congress: Senator Elizabeth Warren.76 Both 
were law school bankruptcy professors before going to Washington. 
Senator Warren has in fact recently cosponsored legislation that goes well 
beyond the ABI’s reform proposals. The Warren proposal would upend 
current bankruptcy practice by curbing corporate debtors’ ability to file for 
bankruptcy in New York and almost completely banning them from filing in 
Delaware.77 The reform would force corporate debtors to file in their local 
jurisdictions. Other similarly dramatic proposals can be found in the existing 
literature. Some have advocated that the claims of hedge funds and other 
distressed debt traders be limited to the amount they paid for their debt. This 
would chill the trading of claims, thus counteracting the expansion of 
consensual transactions. A populist package might also restrict the fees of 
bankruptcy lawyers and financial advisors. 
 
74 See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: 
Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 732-35 n.190 (2008) (describing “empty voting” 
and related issues); Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 42, at 690 (“An ‘empty core’ exists when three 
or more parties cannot reach a stable agreement with each other because some other agreement 
always exists that at least one party prefers.”). 
75 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2014). 
76 For a discussion of intellectual links between the two, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Vern Countryman 
and the Path of Progressive (and Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (2000). 
77 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2018, S. 2282, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018); see also Katy Stech 
Ferek, Bill Aims to Make Bankrupt Companies File for Protection Closer to Home, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bill-aims-to-make-bankrupt-companies-file-for-protection-
closer-to-home-1515444161 [https://perma.cc/L5RA-V5FF] (“The bill, if passed, would mark one of 
the biggest shifts in corporate bankruptcy history, sending cases to courts across the country.”). 
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It is of course possible that sweeping reform will not materialize and there 
will be limited legislative change in the near future—or, indeed, no change at 
all. Either way, bankruptcy judges will continue to serve as the principal check 
on the arrangements devised by the parties, and we expect the overriding 
theme to be recurrence rather than permanent transformation. 
Whatever the future brings, the odds are high that participants in this 
Symposium will figure prominently in the next phase of corporate 
bankruptcy history. The bankruptcy scholars who agreed to convene with us 
in Philadelphia are extraordinary. When future financial historians try to 
make sense of whatever happens next, we hope they will hone in on this 
Symposium in their search for clues. 
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